What this plan can't do
A credible plan states what it cannot do.
- Gravity is real. The US is next door, rich, and speaks the same commercial language. Economists' gravity models say full decoupling is impossible — and they're right. The goal is not zero US trade; it is the Guiding Principles — US share of goods exports from ~72% to ~55% by 2031, ~45% by 2035 and ~35% by 2040, with the same ceiling applied to every other partner, and no single-market chokehold on any strategic commodity.
- Autos, machinery and integrated manufacturing will not divert this decade. Anyone who claims otherwise is selling something. This plan concentrates on what ships in bulk through terminals.
- China is a market, not a friend. It weaponized canola, lobster and pea imports in 2025, then de-escalated in 2026. Sell to China; never depend on it. This plan's canonical concentration caps: no partner above ~one-third of exports; no country above ~30% of any commodity's contract stock; China capped at ~C$40B across all financial instruments combined.
- Green hydrogen economics don't close yet. Two of three Newfoundland megaprojects have already stalled or entered creditor protection. This plan sequences blue ammonia first and treats green as a 2030s wave.
- Permitting and labor, not capital, are the binding constraints. Bill C-5 targets 2-year federal decisions; Germany permitted and built an LNG import terminal in 10 months under emergency law. Canada needs that operating tempo — and tens of thousands of skilled trades, which means immigration and training policy are export policy.
- A new oil pipeline remains contingent, though the picture improved in mid-2026: a proponent now exists (TMC-led with Pembina, announced July 2026, routed to respect the tanker moratorium — no C-48 amendment required), but FID conditions — the federal conditions document (target Sept 2027), Indigenous co-ownership, and commercial commitments — are unresolved. The model keeps it out of base totals until FID.